🔍 Read the full analysis: Can The US Grow 10% More Without Working Much Longer? on ThorstenMeyerAI.com
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TL;DR
US nonfarm business output rose 10.0% from the fourth quarter of 2022 to the second quarter of 2026, while hours worked increased 0.9%, according to calculations from BLS indexes cited by Thorsten Meyer. Productivity is growing faster than in the previous decade, but the figures alone do not show that AI caused the change or explain how its gains are distributed.
US business output has grown much faster than the hours people work: from the fourth quarter of 2022 to the second quarter of 2026, output rose 10.0% while hours worked increased 0.9%, according to calculations from Bureau of Labor Statistics indexes cited by Thorsten Meyer. The figures point to faster productivity growth, but they do not establish that artificial intelligence caused it or show that workers broadly share the gains.
The broader economy is expanding. The Bureau of Economic Analysis reported in its October 29 advance estimate that real gross domestic product grew at a 3.4% annual rate in the third quarter of 2026, up from 2.2% in the second quarter. Investment, consumer spending and government spending all contributed, according to the BEA. That GDP measure covers the overall economy; the productivity figures below cover a narrower business sector.
For the nonfarm business sector, BLS data show output increased 2.5% over the year to the second quarter of 2026, while hours worked rose 0.2%. Productivity — output per hour worked — increased 2.2% over the same period. Meyer’s calculation from BLS indexes finds that from late 2022 to mid-2026, output rose 10.0% and hours rose 0.9%, implying productivity growth of about 2.5% a year over that span.
The longer comparison also indicates faster productivity growth than in the preceding period: the cited annual rate since the end of 2019 is 2.1%, compared with 1.5% from 2007 to 2019. These periods and measures do not identify what caused the change. Meyer notes that the figures can show output and hours moving differently, but cannot by themselves establish a causal link to AI.
Infographic 01 · More output, same hours
Ten percent more output, almost the same hours
The US business sector produces much more than three years ago with almost no extra work. The new jobs are mostly in health care.
The last 12 months
Nonfarm business sector, Q2 2025 to Q2 2026
- Outputreal, value added+2.5%
- Productivityoutput per hour+2.2%
- Hours workedall workers+0.2%
Where the jobs went
Payroll jobs, change over 12 months to Sep 2026 (preliminary)
Since Q4 2022: output +10.0%, hours +0.9%, productivity +9.1% (my arithmetic from the BLS indexes). Hiring rate in Aug 2026: 3.3% of jobs (2019 average 3.9%); layoff rate 1.0% (2019: 1.2%). Correlation, not proof of cause.
Sources: BLS, Productivity and Costs Q2 2026 (3 Sep 2026) · BLS, Employment Situation Sep 2026 · BLS, JOLTS Aug 2026.
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Productivity Gains, Uneven Payoffs
Faster output per hour can allow the economy to produce more without an equivalent increase in hours worked. That can support economic growth and give firms scope to expand production, but productivity statistics alone do not tell readers whether workers benefit through higher pay, better working conditions or more secure jobs.
The employment figures cited in the analysis show why the distribution matters. Payrolls increased by 496,000 in the 12 months to September, but health care and social assistance added 520,000 jobs, while information industries lost 120,000. Those figures describe different industries moving in different directions, not a direct count of jobs displaced by AI. Meyer also reports a 4.2% overall unemployment rate, compared with 8.0% for people aged 20 to 24 and 7.0% for Black workers.
Pay and labor-share measures add to the concern about who benefits, but require careful interpretation. Meyer cites a labor share of 52.8% in the second quarter and a 0.6% decline in real private-sector wages over the year to September. The source describes the labor share as business output paid as wages and benefits. The figures do not, on their own, establish that AI caused these outcomes or explain the effects on individual households.
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What the Productivity Data Measure
BLS productivity data cover the nonfarm business sector: private businesses, excluding farms. The series do not cover government, nonprofits or households, so they should not be treated as a complete measure of every part of the economy. Productivity is calculated as output divided by hours worked; it can rise when output increases faster than hours, or when the same output is produced in fewer hours.
The end of 2022 is often used as a marker for the start of widespread public attention to generative AI, following ChatGPT’s launch on November 30, 2022. A time comparison that begins then can show what happened afterward, but it cannot prove that the launch or adoption of AI caused the change. Other economic shifts may also affect output, hours, hiring and pay.
Meyer’s analysis was published November 1, 2026, after an October 31 Financial Times opinion column asked whether productivity and employment trends were evidence of AI’s labor-market impact. He says he could access that column’s headline and summary, and the Wall Street Journal headline, but not either article in full. His reported comparisons rely on official statistics from the BLS, BEA, Census Bureau, Federal Reserve and Eurostat.
AI’s Role Remains Unproven
The data cited show a gap between growth in output and growth in hours worked, alongside faster productivity growth. They do not establish that AI caused those trends. Meyer reports that only about one in four US businesses said it used AI at all in an early-October Census Bureau measure, and that technology jobs began to shrink before generative AI was in widespread business use. The source does not provide enough detail here to assess the survey’s exact wording, business-size breakdown or how firms defined AI use.
Other uncertainties include how much of recent productivity growth will persist, whether it reflects AI investment or other changes, and how the gains are distributed across workers, firms and sectors. The payroll, wage and labor-share figures describe outcomes, but do not isolate the cause of each outcome. The comparison between output and hours also covers a specified business-sector index and period, rather than every worker or the entire economy.
Meyer points to Europe as a contrasting pattern of more employment alongside flat productivity, but that comparison does not establish why the regions differ. The supplied figures do not provide a detailed like-for-like comparison of industries, measurement periods or policy conditions.
Watch Hiring, Pay and Productivity
The next evidence will come from updated official releases on productivity, hours, employment and wages, along with further Census Bureau data on business use of AI. Those measures can indicate whether the recent pattern continues, changes or is revised as agencies receive more information. The source does not identify a specific upcoming release date.
Readers should watch whether productivity growth remains above its 2007–2019 pace, whether hiring broadens beyond the sectors adding jobs now, and whether real wages and labor’s share of business output improve or decline. More detailed evidence connecting firms’ AI adoption to output, hours and employment would be needed to make a stronger case about AI’s role. Until then, the figures support a report of faster output growth than hours growth, not a settled explanation for why it happened.
Key Questions
Did US business output grow 10% while hours worked rose 0.9%?
Yes, for the period and measures cited. Meyer calculated from BLS indexes that nonfarm business output rose 10.0% from the fourth quarter of 2022 to the second quarter of 2026, while hours worked increased 0.9%.
Does that prove AI is replacing workers?
No. The output and hours figures show a relationship over time, not its cause. The analysis says the pattern could fit an AI explanation, but other explanations also remain possible.
What was US economic growth in the third quarter of 2026?
The BEA’s October 29 advance estimate put real GDP growth at a 3.4% annual rate in the third quarter, compared with 2.2% in the second quarter.
Are jobs growing in every sector?
No. In the 12 months to September, payrolls rose by 496,000 overall, while health care and social assistance added 520,000 jobs and information industries lost 120,000, according to the figures cited by Meyer.
What evidence could clarify AI’s effect on employment?
Further official data on productivity, hours, wages and hiring can show whether current trends persist. To attribute changes to AI, researchers would also need evidence linking firms’ adoption of AI to changes in their output and workforces.
Source: ThorstenMeyerAI.com
